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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Ldonna Marie Youmans appeals from her judgments of conviction for burglary, 
attempted burglary, and possession of hydrocodone.  On appeal she argues that (1) the 
district court abused its discretion by admitting certain evidence; (2) there was 
insufficient evidence to support her conviction of possession of hydrocodone; (3) the 
district court abused its sentencing discretion; and (4) the district court was without 
jurisdiction to hear evidence presented by the state while this appeal was pending. 
 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
Between April 15 and May 15, 2013, Youmans was captured six separate times 
on surveillance video wearing nursing scrubs and entering the Garden Plaza of Valley 
View retirement facility.  (Tr.,1 p.301, Ls.5-16; p.388, L.16 – p.389, L.5; State’s Exs. 1-
6.)  Youmans had previously been employed as a visiting nurse at the retirement facility.  
(Tr., p.248, L.18 – p.250, L.4.)  Each time she entered the facility between 11:20 and 
11:30, when the majority of residents were at lunch.  (Tr., p.386, L.20 – p.387, L.6.)  
Youmans ultimately entered at least seven apartments and attempted to enter an 
additional eleven.  (Tr., p.285, L.10 – p.318, L.3; p.325, L.8 – p.358, L.25.)  Following 
Youmans’ entry into their rooms, residents reported missing prescription medications, 
including hydrocodone.  (Tr., p.268, L.2 – p.269, L.17.)  Management at the retirement 
facility contacted Detective Paporello.  (Tr., p.299, L.24 – p.300, L.9.) 
                                            
1  Citations to “Tr.” refer to the transcript of Youmans’ trial and sentencing hearing 




After viewing the surveillance footage and interviewing one of the victims, 
Detective Paporello met with Youmans.  (Tr., p.421, L.7 – p.422, L.12.)  Youmans 
acknowledged that she had been at the facility and claimed she was there to visit former 
clients.  (Tr., p.425, Ls.1-15.)  However, she did not know the names of the individuals 
into whose rooms she had entered, and it was clear to the officer that she had no 
business being there.  (Tr., p.428, Ls.1-13.)  In fact, she could only name four 
individuals at the retirement facility, and was incorrect on at least one of those names.  
(Tr., p.430, L.6 – p.431, L.8.) 
A warrant was issued for Youmans’ arrest (Tr., p.433, L.20), which was executed 
by Detective Paporello (Tr., p.433, L.23 – p.437, L.17).  During Youmans’ booking at the 
jail, officers discovered 17 loose prescription pills at the bottom of her purse.  (Tr., 
p.437, L.21 – p.438, L.3.)  Using an online database, Detective Paporello later identified 
the prescription pills as hydrocodone.  (Tr., p.440, Ls.20-24; p.449, Ls.10-13.) 
The state charged Youmans with burglary, attempted burglary, and possession 
of hydrocodone.  (R., pp.156-57.)  Youmans pleaded not guilty (R., p.63) and the case 
proceeded to trial (Tr., pp.67-760).  Following trial, the jury found Youmans guilty on 
each count.  (R., pp.259-61.)  The district court entered judgment against Youmans and 
imposed concurrent unified sentences of ten years with three years fixed on the 
burglary conviction and five years with three years fixed on the attempted burglary 
conviction, but retained jurisdiction.2  (R., pp.265-68.)  After the period of retained 
jurisdiction, the district court suspended Youmans’ sentences and placed her on 
                                            
2  The district court also imposed a concurrent 180-day jail sentence on Youmans’ 
conviction for possession of hydrocodone. 
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probation for a period of ten years.  (R., pp.283-87.)  Youmans filed a notice of appeal 
timely from her judgment of conviction.  (R., pp.271-73.) 
In her notice of appeal, Youmans accused the state of “withhold[ing] the 
computer hard drive evidence and not allow[ing] defense counsel full access to it after 
multiple attempts.”  (R., p.272.)  This accusation was baseless and false.  Responding 
to the charge, the state requested that the district court take additional evidence in the 
case and provided affidavits.  (R., pp.290-311.)  Following a pair of hearings, the district 
court granted the state’s motion.  (R., pp.338-42.)  The district court found that the 
proprietary nature of the Garden Plaza of Valley View Senior Living Community’s 
surveillance system prevented the copying of its surveillance videos.  (R., p.339.)  The 
state was able to take custody of the hard drive containing the surveillance video and 
made it available to Youmans’ defense team.  (R., pp.339-340.)  County IT experts 
attempted to make copies of the video, but could not.  (R., p.340.)  Experts hired by 
Youmans also attempted to make copies, but could not.  (Id.)  The court concluded that 
there was “no basis to support a finding that the State ‘withheld’ any evidence; rather 
the surveillance software prohibited it from being copied.”  (R., p.341.) 
In her appellant’s brief, Youmans has chosen to not pursue the spurious claim 






Youmans states the issues on appeal as: 
 
1. Did the district court abuse its discretion by admitting the testimony 
of Officer Kip Paporello regarding the identification of the pills found on 
Ms. Youmans, due to the State’s failure to lay a proper foundation for the 
testimony? 
 
2. Was there insufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable 
doubt that Ms. Youmans possessed a controlled substance without a valid 
prescription? 
 
3. Did the district court abuse its discretion by imposing unified 
sentences of ten years, with three years fixed and five years, with two 
years fixed fixed [sic], upon Ms. Youmans [sic] convictions for burglary 
and attempted burglary, to be served concurrently, in light of the mitigating 
factors present in the case? 
 
4. Was the district court without jurisdiction to make any factual 
findings related to the prosecutorial misconduct alleged in the Notice of 
Appeal after Ms. Youmans timely appealed to this Court? 
 
(Appellant’s brief, p.5.) 
 
The state rephrases the issues as: 
 
1. Has Youmans failed to establish that the district court abused its discretion by 
admitting Detective Paporello’s opinion testimony during trial? 
 
2. Was substantial competent evidence admitted at trial from which the jury could 
conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Youmans was guilty of the crime of 
possession of hydrocodone? 
 
3. Has Youmans failed to show an abuse of the district court’s sentencing 
discretion? 
 
4. Youmans has chosen not to pursue on appeal her spurious accusation that the 
prosecutor withheld evidence in this case.  Is her claim that the district court lacked 






Youmans Has Failed To Establish That The District Court Abused Its Discretion By 
Admitting Detective Paporello’s Opinion Testimony 
 
A. Introduction 
After Youmans’ arrest for burglary, during her subsequent booking at the county 
jail, police discovered several loose pills in the bottom of her purse.  (Tr., p.437, L.18 – 
p.439, L.6.)  At trial, over Youmans’ objection, Detective Paporello testified that he used 
an online database and identified those pills as hydrocodone with a strength of 5-325 
milligrams.  (Tr., p.440, L.20 – p.449, L.15.)  The detective explained that, through his 
training in law enforcement, he was aware that every medication has its own identifiers, 
including numbers, shapes, and colors.  (Tr., p.441, L.24 – p.442, L.11.)  In making his 
identification, he used an online application to cross-check those identifiers.  (Tr., p.440, 
Ls.23-24; p.441, L.15 – p.443, L.11.)  Use of the online application, the detective 
explained, was consistent with his experience and the practice and recommendations of 
other officers who worked with prescription pills.  (Tr., p.445, L.2 – p.446, L.21.) 
On appeal Youmans argues that Detective Paporello’s identification of the 
hydrocodone should have been excluded for lack of foundation.  (Appellant’s brief, pp.6-
10.)  Application of the correct legal standards, however, shows that the district court 
properly exercised its discretion in allowing the detective’s opinion testimony which 
related to a fact within his personal knowledge.  Youmans has failed to establish an 




B. Standard Of Review 
The trial court has broad discretion in the admission of evidence, and its 
judgment will be reversed only when there has been a clear abuse of that discretion.  
State v. Perry, 139 Idaho 520, 521, 81 P.3d 1230, 1231 (2003).  Specifically, whether 
sufficient foundation has been laid for the admission of evidence is committed to the 
discretion of the trial court.  State v. Glass, 146 Idaho 77, 81, 190 P.3d 896, 901 (Ct. 
App. 2008). 
 
C. Detective Paporello’s Testimony Was Supported By Adequate Foundation 
 
Lay opinion testimony which is based on a matter within the witness’ personal 
knowledge and helpful to a determination of a fact in issue is generally admissible.  
State v. Enyeart, 123 Idaho 452, 454, 849 P.2d 125, 127 (Ct. App. 1993).  Lay opinion 
testimony is governed by Idaho Rule of Evidence 701, which provides: 
If the witness is not testifying as an expert, the testimony of the witness in 
the form of opinions or inferences is limited to those opinions or inferences 
which are (a) rationally based on the perception of the witness and (b) 
helpful to a clear understanding of the testimony of the witness or the 
determination of a fact in issue, and (c) not based on scientific, technical 
or other specialized knowledge within the scope of Rule 702. 
 
I.R.E. 701. 
Detective Paporello’s testimony was properly admitted under Rule 701.  First, the 
testimony was “rationally based on the perception of the witness.”  By cross-checking 
the loose pills in an online database, Detective Paporello personally identified them as 
hydrocodone.  Second, the testimony was “helpful” to both “a clear understanding of the 
testimony of the witness” and “the determination of a fact in issue.”  Recognizing that 
Detective Paporello used an online database to identify the loose pills as hydrocodone, 
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consistent with the practice of other officers who more frequently are required to identify 
prescription medications, is helpful to understanding the detective’s testimony.  And the 
pills’ identification as hydrocodone is a fact in issue.  Third, the detective’s testimony 
was “not based on scientific, technical or other specialized knowledge within the scope 
of Rule 702.”  As he explained, consistent with his prior practice and the 
recommendation of other officers, Detective Paporello used an online application to 
identify the pills.  (Tr., p.440, L.23 – p.443, L.11; p.445, L.2 – p.446, L.22.) 
Moreover, notwithstanding Youmans’ arguments to the contrary (see Appellant’s 
brief, pp.8-10), specialized scientific training is not required to identify prescription 
medications.3  Under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 321, et. 
seq, the Secretary of Health and Human Services, through the Federal Drug 
Administration, is authorized to regulate prescription medications.  Under 21 CFR § 
206.10, promulgated under this authority, 
[u]nless exempted under 206.7, no drug product in solid oral 
dosage form may be introduced or delivered for introduction into interstate 
commerce unless it is clearly marked or imprinted with a code imprint that, 
in conjunction with the product’s size, shape, and color, permits the unique 
identification of the drug product and the manufacturer or distributor of the 
product.  
 
The purpose of this regulation is to make it possible for lay people to identify 
prescription medications.  The regulation also makes it possible for them to identify the 
                                            
3  Moreover, the state disagrees with Youmans’ assertion that the prosecutor below 
conceded that expert testimony would be necessary to identify the prescription 
medications.  (See Appellant’s brief, pp.7-8, 14.)  Whether the prosecutor misspoke or 
the transcriptionist made an error in the appellate report, the prosecutor’s argument in 
context (Tr., p.444, Ls.3-9) suggests that the prosecutor was arguing the exact opposite 
of what Youmans claims. 
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medications’ strength, as “[i]dentification of the drug product requires identification of its 
active ingredients and its dosage strength.”  Id. 
Ultimately, the reliability of the online databases in properly identifying 
prescription medications, or Detective Paporello’s personal experience using such 
databases, may be issues of potential impeachment.  But these questions go to the 
weight of Detective Paporello’s testimony, not its admissibility.  The district court 
properly exercised its discretion when it allowed the detective to testify that, using an 
online database, he identified the loose pills found at the bottom of Youmans’ purse as 
hydrocodone.  Youmans has failed to show an abuse of the district court’s discretion. 
 
II. 
Substantial Competent Evidence Admitted At Trial Supports The Jury’s Conclusion That 
Youmans Was Guilty Of Possession Of Hydrocodone 
 
A. Introduction 
Youmans argues that there was insufficient evidence for a jury to find her guilty 
of possession of hydrocodone.  (Appellant’s brief, pp.12-14.)  Review of the trial record, 
however, demonstrates that the jury’s verdict is supported by the substantial competent 
evidence presented at trial. 
 
B. Standard Of Review 
An appellate court will not set aside a judgment of conviction entered upon a jury 
verdict if there is substantial evidence upon which a reasonable trier of fact could have 
found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.  State v. 
Sheahan, 139 Idaho 267, 285-86, 77 P.3d 956, 974-75 (2003) (citation omitted).  “On 
appeal, where a defendant stands convicted, the evidence is viewed in the light most 
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favorable to the prosecution and the reviewing court is precluded from substituting its 
judgment for that of the jury as to the credibility of witnesses, the weight of the evidence 
and the reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence.”  Id. 
 
C. The Jury’s Verdict Finding Youmans Guilty Of Possession Of Hydrocodone Is 
Supported By The Evidence Presented At Trial 
 
On appeal Youmans argues that her conviction is not supported by sufficient 
evidence.  (Appellant’s brief, pp.11-14.)  The jury found Youmans guilty of possession of 
hydrocodone in violation of Idaho Code § 37-2732(c), which makes it a crime to 
possess certain controlled substances without a prescription.  At trial, Detective 
Paporello testified that during the booking process following Youmans’ arrest, he 
watched officers remove several loose pills from the bottom of Youmans’ purse.  (Tr., 
p.437, L.18 – p.439, L.6.)  The detective later identified those pills as hydrocodone.  
(Tr., p.449, Ls.10-15.)  That was sufficient evidence whereby the jury could conclude 
that Youmans possessed hydrocodone. 
As noted above, Youmans contends on appeal that Detective Paporello’s 
identification of the hydrocodone should have been excluded for lack of foundation and, 
absent that evidence, she claims there was insufficient evidence to convict her.  
(Appellant’s brief, pp.11-14.)  This argument fails on two grounds:  First, as shown 
above, Detective Paporello’s identification of the hydrocodone was properly admitted 
into evidence.  Second, even if that identification should have been excluded, Youmans’ 
argument is still directly contrary to the relevant legal standard that, in determining 
whether sufficient evidence to support a conviction was presented at trial, the Court 
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reviews the evidence that was actually presented to the jury without regard to its 
admissibility.  State v. Moore, 148 Idaho 887, 894, 231 P.3d 532, 539 (Ct. App. 2010). 
Moreover, Youmans implicitly admitted that she possessed hydrocodone.  (See 
Tr., p.600, L.24 – p.604, L.6.)  Youmans’ primary defense seems to have been based 
upon whether she had a prescription for the hydrocodone pills.  She asserted that she 
did.  (Tr., p.600, L.24 – p.604, L.6.)  But as noted above, the credibility of witnesses is 
an issue for the jury, Sheahan, 139 Idaho at 285-86, 77 P.3d at 974-75, and the jury 
was able to (and clearly did) reject Youmans’ assertion. 
Sufficient competent evidence was presented at trial whereby the jury could 
conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Youmans possessed hydrocodone without a 
prescription.  Youmans’ conviction should be affirmed. 
 
III. 




Youmans argues that, in light of allegedly mitigating factors, the district court 
abused its discretion by imposing underlying concurrent sentences of ten years with 
three fixed on her burglary conviction and five years with three fixed on her attempted 
burglary conviction.  (Appellant’s brief, pp.14-18.)  Youmans has failed to establish an 




B. Standard Of Review 
“Sentencing decisions are reviewed for an abuse of discretion.”  State v. Moore, 
131 Idaho 814, 823, 965 P.2d 174, 183 (1998) (citing State v. Wersland, 125 Idaho 499, 
873 P.2d 144 (1994)). 
 
C. The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion By Imposing Underlying 
Concurrent Sentences Of Ten Years With Three Years Fixed And Five Years 
With Three Years Fixed On Youmans’ Felony Convictions 
 
Where a sentence is within statutory limits, an appellant is required to establish 
that the sentence is a clear abuse of discretion.  State v. Baker, 136 Idaho 576, 577, 38 
P.3d 614, 615 (2001) (citing State v. Lundquist, 134 Idaho 831, 11 P.3d 27 (2000)).  To 
carry this burden, Youmans must show that her sentence is excessive under any 
reasonable view of the facts.  Baker, 136 Idaho at 577, 38 P.3d at 615.  A sentence is 
reasonable if appropriate to achieve the primary objective of protecting society, and any 
or all of the related sentencing goals of deterrence, rehabilitation, or retribution.  State v. 
Wolfe, 99 Idaho 382, 384, 582 P.2d 728, 730 (1978).  While the Court reviews the 
whole sentence on appeal, it presumes that the fixed portion of the sentence will be the 
defendant’s probable term of confinement.  State v. Oliver, 144 Idaho 722, 726, 170 
P.3d 387, 391 (2007).  In deference to the trial judge, the Court will not substitute its 
view of a reasonable sentence where reasonable minds might differ.  State v. Toohill, 
103 Idaho 565, 568, 650 P.2d 707, 710 (Ct. App. 1982). 
The underlying sentences imposed by the district court were reasonable and are 
supported by the nature of Youmans’ crimes.  As the district court noted, Youmans 
entered a senior care center, where she had no business being, wearing scrubs, acting 
as though she worked there, showing up during the lunch hour, and breaking into 
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people’s rooms when they were most likely to be out at lunch.  (Tr., p.780, Ls.7-22.)  
Contrary to Youmans’ claims at trial and even during the sentencing hearing, she was 
not there to care for former clients—she did not know most of her victims, and many of 
them claimed they did not know her.  (Tr., p.780, L.23 – p.781, L.2.)  After considering 
this evidence, the district court explained that 
the evidence shows the defendant preyed upon elderly, vulnerable adults, 
residents of Valley View, after she had no clients there.  She was there to 
prey upon vulnerable individuals, and to steal prescription medications, 
which is reprehensible conduct for anybody that works in—in any 
business, doing anything. 
 
(Tr., p.781, Ls.3-10.) 
Now on appeal Youmans argues that, despite this reprehensible conduct, she 
deserved a withheld judgment.  (Appellant’s brief, pp.16-18.)  The district court rejected 
giving Youmans a withheld judgment at sentencing, explaining: 
In order for this Court to grant a withheld judgment, it, by law, must 
have a level of confidence that an individual who receives a withheld 
judgment can be and will be successful with a withheld judgment.  I have 
the opposite of confidence in that; I have no confidence at all.  I don’t think 
Ms. Youmans has come clean with herself, what she was doing there.  
This—she may have had some fondness for some clients, former clients, 
but these were all events, on multiple acts, multiple dates, all on the lunch 
hour, planned in advance.  And it went well beyond, frankly, breaking 
boundaries, quote, unquote, which the defendant—is all she’s willing to 
admit. 
 
(Tr., p.781, L.22 – p.782, L.9.)  The district court’s findings are supported by the 
evidence.  During sentencing, while recognizing that Youmans was convicted of both 
burglary and attempted burglary, defense counsel also noted that Youmans “still 
maintains that she never took anything; however, she does understand that she did 
break boundaries.  She feels that she did take advantage of these people by not 
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listening to their concerns….”  (Tr., p.776, Ls.18-24 (emphasis added).)  Youmans took 
advantage of the patients by stealing their prescription medication.  Unable to accept 
responsibility for those actions, she was not a candidate for a withheld judgment. 
In the alternative, Youmans maintains that her sentence is excessive because 
she has the support of friends and strong family relations, and her prior convictions 
were all for misdemeanors.  (Appellant’s brief, pp.16-18.)  Both arguments fail.  First, 
the support of friends and strong family relationships did not prevent Youmans’ crimes.  
Second, as shown above, her sentences are reasonable based on her reprehensible 
conduct in this case alone; that she has additional convictions only adds weight to the 
reasonableness of the district court’s sentences. 
The district court properly exercised its discretion when it imposed concurrent 
sentences of ten years with three fixed on Youmans’ burglary conviction and five years 
with three fixed on her attempted burglary conviction.  Because Youmans has failed to 
show that her sentences are excessive, she has failed to show an abuse of the court’s 
discretion.  Her sentences should be affirmed. 
 
IV. 
Youmans’ Claim That The District Court Lacked Jurisdiction To Receive Additional 
Evidence During The Pendency Of Her Appeal Is Moot 
 
A. Introduction 
For the first time in her notice of appeal, Youmans claimed that a perspective 
issue on appeal was “[d]id the State withhold the computer hard drive evidence and not 
allow defense counsel full access to it after multiple attempts?”  (R., p.272.)  While 
Youmans had filed a motion to compel discovery of the hard drive below, the district 
court was never given the opportunity to make a final ruling on that issue because 
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Youmans withdrew her motion to compel.  (See 7/21/2015 Tr., p.23, Ls.2-15.)  
Blindsided by Youmans’ stated intent to raise a prosecutorial misconduct claim for the 
first time on appeal, the prosecutor filed a motion for the district court to reopen the case 
and take additional evidence that the state had made the hard drive available for 
viewing by Youmans’ counsel, but proprietary software prevented experts for both the 
state and Youmans from copying the hard drive.  (R., pp.290-311.)  The district court 
granted the state’s motion.  (R., pp.338-42.) 
Now on appeal Youmans argues that the district court was without jurisdiction to 
consider the additional evidence presented by the prosecutor.  (Appellant’s brief, pp.18-
21.)  This issue is moot and should not be considered on appeal. 
 
B. Standard Of Review 
“Justiciability issues, such as mootness, are freely reviewed.”  State v. Barclay, 
149 Idaho 6, 8, 232 P.3d 327, 329 (2010) (citing State v. Manley, 142 Idaho 338, 342, 
127 P.3d 954, 958 (2005)). 
 
C. Because Youmans Has Not Pursued On Appeal Her Spurious Claim That The 
Prosecutor Withheld Evidence, Whether The District Court Had Jurisdiction To 
Consider Additional Evidence On That Issue Is Moot 
 
The mootness doctrine precludes review when “the issues presented are no 
longer live or the parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome.”  Idaho 
Schools for Equal Educ. Opp. v. Idaho State Bd. of Educ., 128 Idaho 276, 281, 912 
P.2d 644, 649 (1996) (quoting Bradshaw v. State, 120 Idaho 429, 432, 816 P.2d 986, 
989 (1991)).  “A case is moot if it presents no justiciable controversy and a judicial 
determination will have no practical effect upon the outcome.”  In re Doe I, 145 Idaho 
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337, 340, 179 P.3d 300, 303 (2008) (citation omitted).  On appeal, Youmans has 
(properly) not raised the spurious and baseless allegation that the prosecutor withheld 
evidence.  (See Appellant’s brief.)  A judicial determination of whether the district court 
had jurisdiction to consider the additional evidence offered by the prosecutor below, 
therefore, will have no practical effect upon the outcome of this case.  Without that 
justiciable controversy, Youmans is essentially asking this Court for an advisory opinion.  
The Court should therefore not address this issue on appeal. 
 
D. If This Moot Issue Is Considered, The State Agrees That The District Court 
Lacked Jurisdiction To Consider Additional Evidence 
 
Though Youmans can only ask for an advisory opinion, and is entitled to no 
relief, if this moot issue is nevertheless considered by the Court, the state agrees that 
the district court was without jurisdiction to consider the additional evidence.  Generally, 
once a notice of appeal has been filed, the district court lacks jurisdiction to take any 
action in a case except as permitted by Idaho Appellate Rule 13.  State v. Lemmons, 
158 Idaho 971, 974, 354 P.3d 1186, 1189 (2015).  Rule 13(c) sets forth the authority of 
the district court to rule on motions and take actions while a case is on appeal.  The only 
provision that may be applicable to this case is subsection 13(c)(10), which states that 
the court can “[e]nter any other order after judgment affecting the substantial rights of 
the defendant as authorized by law.”  The state is aware of no such law authorizing the 
district court’s action in this case. 
But there should be such a law. 
Generally, issues raised for the first time in a notice of appeal, without any 
adverse ruling by the district court, should be reserved for post-conviction proceedings 
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because such issues will rarely have been fully developed and, as such, any alleged 
error cannot be clear from the record.  As this Court has recognized, where “there is 
insufficient evidence in the appellate record to show clear error, the matter would be 
better handled in post-conviction proceedings.”  State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 226, 224 
P.3d 961, 978 (2010).  To be clear on the record, there must be no “need for any 
additional information not contained in the appellate record, including information as to 
whether the failure to object was a tactical decision.”  Id. at 228, 224 P.3d at 980.  
Because resolution of these issues would require the taking of evidence or resolving of 
factual questions, they should only be considered before the district court.  One purpose 
of this limitation on appellate authority is to prevent litigants from “sandbagging the 
court, i.e., remaining silent about [their] objection and belatedly raising the error only if 
the case does not conclude in [their] favor.”  Id. at 224, 224 P.3d at 976 (citation and 
internal quotation omitted).  And that is exactly what Youmans threatened to do in her 
notice of appeal. 
But Youmans’ threatened issue—in addition to sandbagging the court—was not 
a mere allegation of some trial error; it was a serious accusation of prosecutorial 
misconduct.  And though claims that lack a complete record and need additional factual 
findings should only be decided before the trial court, if an appellate court were to take 
the issue and attempt to resolve it without the benefit of a complete factual record, it 
could result in deleterious effect to the prosecutor’s reputation and legal career.  Where 
the prosecutor has evidence refuting such spurious, baseless accusations, he or she 
should be allowed to answer the allegations before the district court. 
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Where evidence directly refuting spurious allegations, raised for the first time in a 
notice of appeal, is readily available and such baseless accusations can easily be 
answered, the otherwise aggrieved party should be allowed to make its case before the 
district court, creating a full factual record for the benefit of both the parties on appeal 
and this Court’s ultimate determination of the issues. 
 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm Youmans’ conviction and 
sentences. 
 DATED this 23rd day of May, 2016. 
 
 
      _/s/ Russell J. Spencer__ 
      RUSSELL J. SPENCER 
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